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Abstract
We examine the empirical relationship between immigration and crime across Italian
provinces during the period 1990-2003. Drawing on police administrative records, we
rst document that the size of the immigrant population is positively correlated with the
incidence of property crimes and with the overall crime rate. Then, we use instrumental
variables based on immigration toward destination countries other than Italy to identify
the causal impact of exogenous changes in Italy's immigrant population. According to
these estimates, immigration increases only the incidence of robberies, while leaving un-
aected all other types of crime. Since robberies represent a very minor fraction of all
criminal oenses, the eect on the overall crime rate is not signicantly dierent from zero.
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Immigration is a contentious issue in all destination countries for at least two reasons. First,
worker 
ows from countries characterized by a dierent composition of the labor force may
have signicant redistributive consequences for the native population. Second, there are
widespread concerns that immigrants increase crime rates. While the economic literature has
devoted much attention to the rst issue, the second one has remained largely unexplored.
However, citizens and policymakers in recipient countries seem more concerned about
the impact of immigrants on crime. Figure 1 shows the results of the National Identity
Survey carried out in 1995 and 2003 by the International Social Survey Programme. It
clearly emerges that, within OECD countries, the majority of the population is worried that
immigrants increase crime rates. In most cases this fraction is greater than that of people
afraid of being displaced from the labor market.
In this paper we investigate the empirical relationship between immigration and crime
across Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003. As we discuss in the next section, this
sample displays some interesting features for the purpose of our analysis. First, the dramatic
increase in Italy's immigrant population was mainly driven by political turmoil in neighboring
countries, which provides a source of exogenous variation to address causality from immigra-
tion to crime. Second, Italian authorities have implemented several massive regularizations
of previously unocial immigrants, which allow us to assess the extent of measurement errors
induced by immigrants who reside in Italy without holding a valid residence permit.
In Section 3 we present the results of OLS regressions. The identication of the eect
of immigration on crime relies on within-province changes in both variables, controlling for
other determinants of criminal activity and for year-specic unobserved shocks. This two-way
xed eects specication also removes errors in the measurement of immigration and crime
(due to unocial immigrants and non-reported crimes) that are constant within provinces or
years. According to these estimates, a 1% increase in the immigrant population is associated
with a 0.1% increase in the total number of criminal oenses. Once we distinguish between
categories of crime, the eect seems particularly strong for property crimes.
In Section 4 we ask whether this evidence can be attributed to a causal eect of immigra-
tion on crime. In particular, the location choice of immigrants could respond to unobserved
factors that are themselves correlated with crime; as a result, OLS estimates may be bi-
ased. To solve this problem, we exploit dierences in the intensity of migration across origin
countries as a source of (exogenous) variation in the distribution of immigrants in Italy. In
particular, we use changes in the immigrant population in the rest of Europe as an instrument
for changes in immigration across Italian provinces. Our identication strategy relies on the
fact that the supply-push component of migration by nationality is common to 
ows toward
all destination countries. At the same time, 
ows toward the rest of Europe are exogenous to









































2in the immigrant population results from dierences in the beginning-of-period distribution
of immigrants by origin country.
After taking into account the endogeneity of immigration, we nd that the eect on total
or property crime is not signicantly dierent from zero. When we examine dierent types of
property crime, we only nd an eect on robberies. These are a very small fraction of crimes,
which is why we do not nd an eect on total crime rates.
The reported dierence between the OLS and IV results may be explained either by a
lack of causal eect or by a higher asymptotic variance of two-stage estimates. Our ndings
strongly support the former explanation. The second-stage estimated coecient is in fact
always close to zero and decreases even further as we enhance the explanatory power of the
instrument by allowing for a non-linear relationship in the rst-stage. In addition to that,
we perform a number of other robustness checks. We account for possibly heterogeneous
eects across nationalities; we apply dierent methods to estimate the population of irregular
immigrants; and we allow for spatial correlation of provincial crime rates. Our results are
remarkably stable; again, they do not reveal any causal eect of immigration on crime.
This paper is related to the empirical literature on the eects of immigration in the host
countries. This lively research area has emphasized the labor market competition between
immigrants and natives (surveys include Borjas, 1994; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Bauer and
Zimmermann, 2002; Card, 2005) and the eects of immigration on scal balances (Storeslet-
ten, 2000; Lee and Miller, 2000; Chojnicki et al., 2005). We contribute to this literature by
estimating the eect of immigration on crime.
A few previous papers have investigated the existence of this relationship in the United
States. At the micro level, Butcher and Piehl (1998b, 2005) nd that current immigrants
have lower incarceration rates than natives, while the pattern is reversed for the early 1900s
(Moehling and Piehl, 2007). At the aggregate level, Butcher and Piehl (1998a) look at a
sample of U.S. metropolitan areas over the 1980s and conclude that new immigrants' in
ows
had no signicant impact on crime rates. Finally, Borjas et al. (2010) argue that recent
immigrants have contributed to the criminal activity of native black males by displacing
them from the labor market. We complement these ndings by providing the rst available
evidence on a European country in which, as suggested by Figure 1, crime concerns are more
widespread and, therefore, they are likely to play a greater role for the setting of immigration
restrictions.1
1Card et al. (2009) provide detailed evidence on the importance of crime perceptions and more generally of









































22 Immigration and crime in Italy
2.1 Conceptual framework
From a theoretical viewpoint, there are several reasons to expect a signicant relationship
between immigration and crime. First, if immigrants and natives have dierent crime propen-
sities, immigration will directly aect crime rates. According to the economic theory of crime
(Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973), this may happen because immigrants and natives face dierent
legitimate earning opportunities, dierent probabilities of being convicted and dierent costs
of conviction. Indeed, LaLonde and Topel (1991) and Borjas (1998) document that immi-
grants in the U.S. experience worse labor market conditions, which would predict a higher
crime propensity. At the same time, Butcher and Piehl (2005) stress that the punishment
immigrants face includes also the risk of deportation, and this risk may be a powerful de-
terrent to criminal activities. They show that a broadening of the set of crimes for which
immigrants could be deported, as it was implemented in the U.S. in the 1990s, aected both
the type of immigrants and their behavior once in the country.
Second, immigration may aect crime rates as a result of natives' response to the in
ows
of immigrants. Borjas et al. (2010) show in fact that U.S. natives (particularly black males)
increased their criminal activities in response to labor market competition with immigrants.
The overall direction of these dierent eects is often dicult to determine a priori, hence
identifying the relationship between immigration and crime is ultimately an empirical issue.
This appears to be the case in the Italian context too. Immigrants in Italy earn signif-
icantly less than natives, partly due to the fact that they are disproportionally young and
low skilled: as of 2000, 65% of immigrants were between 18 and 39 years old, 54% were
male and 85% of them had no (recognized) education (Del Boca and Venturini, 2003). In
addition to that, immigrants also experience worse labor market outcomes than natives with
similar (observable) individual characteristics: Del Boca and Venturini (2003) estimate that
about one third of the average wage dierential between immigrants and natives cannot be
explained by dierent workers' characteristics. Therefore, dierent demographic characteris-
tics and lower legitimate earning opportunities would predict that immigrants in Italy have
a higher propensity to commit crime than natives.
There are however other eects which may decrease immigrants' crime propensity. In
particular, immigrants in Italy experience a signicantly higher cost of crime than natives
because of a greater probability of incarceration (conditional on having committed an oense).
According to the Italian Ministry of Justice, as of 2007 only 34% of immigrants in prison
served a denitive sentence, while the opposite pattern holds for natives.2 Moreover, even
after a denitive sentence, they typically have less access to alternative measures such as home
detention, due to the fact that immigrants are often unable to exhibit an ocial domicile in
the country.









































2Turning to natives' response to immigration, the mechanism proposed by Borjas et al.
(2010) may be less of an issue in our context. Immigrants do not appear to have a negative
impact on natives' wages or employment opportunities; if anything, complementarities have
been documented in the Italian labor market (see Del Boca and Venturini, 2003, for a review).
This is of course just one possible mechanism; we return to natives' response to immigration
in Sections 5 and 6.
2.2 Data and measurement issue
We assembled data on immigration and crime for all 95 Italian provinces during the period
1990-2003. Italian provinces correspond to level 3 in the Eurostat Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics (NUTS) classication; they are comparable in size to U.S. counties. In
1995, eight new provinces were created by secession. In order to keep our series consistent,
we attribute their post-1995 data to the corresponding pre-1995 province.
2.2.1 Crime rates
Our measure of criminal activity is the number of crimes reported by the police to the
judiciary authority over the total province population, published yearly by Italy's National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). Reported crimes are disaggregated by type of criminal oense:
violent crimes, property crimes (robbery, common theft, car theft) and drug-related crimes.
Availability of these data determined our sample period. In 2004, in fact, a new national
crime recording standard was adopted, implying a lack of comparability of data before and
after that year (ISTAT, 2004, p.27).
Reported crimes underestimate the true (unobserved) number of committed crimes, which
may bias econometric estimates of the eect of those determinants of criminal activity that
are correlated with the extent of under reporting. This problem is well known in the crime
literature and it is usually dealt with by taking logarithms of crime rates and exploiting
the panel structure of data to include xed eects for geographical areas and time periods;
see, for instance, Ehrlich (1996), Levitt (1996), Gould et al. (2002), Oster and Agell (2007)
and Foug ere et al. (2009). This approach sweeps out measurement errors that are constant
within geographical areas (over time) or within periods (across areas). This is most likely
the case for many sources of under reporting (e.g. law enforcement, culture, etc.), which in
turn implies that
crime
it = i + t + crimeit; (1)
where crime
it and crimeit are the logarithms of actual and reported crimes over the popula-
tion in province i and year t, respectively, and i and t are province and year xed eects.
Therefore, we will use crimeit as a proxy for the true (unobserved) crime rate. Accordingly,
total, violent, property and drug will denote the logarithms of reported crimes over the total










































The rst law regulating the in
ows of foreigners was approved in 1990 and subsequently
amended in 1998 and 2002. Throughout this period, Italian migration policy has remained
grounded on the residence permit, which allows the holder to stay legally in the country for a
given period of time. We have drawn directly on police administrative records for recovering
the number of valid residence permits over the population, which will serve as our measure
of immigration.
This measure neglects the presence of unocial immigrants, who reside in the country
without holding a valid residence permit. Most importantly, correlation of unocial immi-
gration with the level of criminal activity would lead to a bias in the estimates of the eect of
immigration on crime. However, the combination of logarithms and xed eects may attenu-
ate the in
uence of this source of measurement error too. Analogously to the case of crime, if
ocial immigrants are proportional to total immigrants and the constant of proportionality
is the product of province- and year-specic constants, it follows that
migr
it = i + t + migrit; (2)
where migr
it and migrit are the logarithms of total and ocial immigrants over the popula-
tion, respectively, and i and t are province and year xed eects.
Regularizations of previously unocial immigrants provide us with the opportunity to
assess the accuracy of this approximation. In these occasions, unocial immigrants already
residing in Italy can apply for a valid residence permit. The last three regularizations took
place in 1995, 1998 and 2002, and involved 246, 217 and 700 thousand individuals, respec-
tively. The acceptance rate of applications was always close to 100%, so that foreigners had
clear incentives to report their irregular status. Hence, under reporting may be less serious
and less correlated with other variables than in survey data and in apprehension statistics.3
Therefore, we extracted from police administrative archives also the number of applica-
tions for regularization in each province. These data allowed us to reconstruct the log of total
(ocial plus unocial) immigrants over province population in the three years in which there
was a regularization. The relationship between migr
it and migrit in (2) (net of province and
year xed eects) is presented in Figure 2. The OLS estimated coecient of migrit is very
close to 1; the R2 coecient is 99%. These two ndings conrm that logarithms and xed
eects remove most of the measurement error induced by the use of ocial immigrants only.
Since total immigrants would be unobserved out of regularization years, we will use the (log
of) ocial immigrants instead.4
3In any case, all these alternative measures of unocial immigration are strongly correlated with each
other, as we discuss further in Section 5.
4In Section 5, we show that our results are robust to dierent assumptions about the stock of irregular









































22.3 Trends in immigration and crime
Over the period 1990-2003, the number of residence permits rose by a factor of 5, from
436,000 (less than 1% of the total population) to over 2.2 million (4% of the population).
This dramatic increase was mainly driven by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Balkan
Wars (Del Boca and Venturini, 2003). Indeed, immigration from Eastern Europe grew at a
rate of 537%, as compared with 134% from Northern Africa and 170% from Asia. Moreover,
within Italy, immigrants tend to settle where immigrants of the same nationality are relatively
more numerous. During our sample period, provinces which experienced the highest growth
of immigration were in the North-East of Italy, where the initial share of immigrants from
Eastern Europe was also higher.5 Accordingly, in our empirical specication, we exploit the
role of external factors in origin countries and of migration networks to identify the causal
eect of immigration on crime.
During the same period, the level of criminal activity did not display any signicant
trend. At a rst glance, therefore, the two variables do not appear to be systematically
correlated over time (Figure 3). On the other hand, immigration is positively correlated
with crime across provinces (Figure 4). However, this nding could be due to the fact that
both variables respond to other (omitted) factors. For instance, higher wealth in Northern
Italy seems to encourage both immigration and property crimes, which represent 83% of all
criminal oenses in our sample. In the next section we move beyond these simple correlations
and into multivariate econometric analysis.
3 Panel analysis
Identifying the eect of migration on crime requires to control for other factors that may
aect both variables. Taking into account the measurement issues discussed in the previous
section, our main estimating equation is
crimeit = migrit + 
0Xit + i + t + "it; (3)
where crimeit is the log of the crime rate reported by the police in province i during year t;
migrit is the log of immigrants over population; Xit is a set of control variables; i and t
are province and year xed eects; nally, "it is an error term. We are mainly interested in
identifying the coecient .
The set of observables Xit comprises demographic and socioeconomic determinants of
crime.6 Demographic variables include the log of resident population in the province, pop.
5Roughly, in 1990, provinces with the highest shares of immigrants from East Europe were in the North
(Gorizia, Trieste, Udine); immigrants from North Africa were relatively more represented in the South (Tra-
pani, Agrigento, Ragusa); immigrants from Asia were more in Central Italy (Perugia, Florence, Rome).










































2Since equation (3) includes province xed eects, pop implicitly controls for population den-
sity, which is considered a key determinant of the level of criminal activity (Glaeser and
Sacerdote, 1999). For the same reason, we also include the share of the population living in
cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, urban. Finally, since young men are said to be
more prone to engage in criminal activities than the rest of the population (Freeman, 1991;
Levitt, 1998; Grogger, 1998), we add the percentage of men aged 15-39, male1539.
Turning to the socioeconomic variables, we include the (log of) real GDP per capita, gdp,
and the unemployment rate, unemp, which measure the legitimate and illegitimate earning
opportunities (Ehrlich, 1973; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; Gould et al., 2002). As a
proxy for the expected costs of crime, we follow Ehrlich (1996) in using the clear-up rate,
dened as the ratio of crimes cleared up by the police over the total number of reported
crimes (by type of oense). The political orientation of the local government may also aect
the amount of resources devoted to crime deterrence (while being at the same time correlated
with immigration restrictions at the local level).7 Therefore, we include the variable partisan,
which takes on higher values the more the local government leans toward the right of the
political spectrum. Finally, xed eects control for other unobserved factors that do not
vary within provinces or years, including the constants 's and 's in equations (1) and (2),
respectively.
Detailed denitions and sources for all variables are presented in the Appendix. Table
1 shows some descriptive statistics and Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among all
dependent and explanatory variables. The univariate correlation between immigration and
crime rates is positive for all types of crime.
OLS estimates on equation (3) are presented in Table 3 and suggest that the total crime
rate is signicantly correlated with the incidence of immigrants in the population. This
relationship is robust to controlling for other determinants of crime. According to these
ndings, a 1% increase in the immigrant population is associated with a 0.1% increase of
total crimes.
Distinguishing between types of crime, the eect is driven by property crimes, while
violent and drug-related crimes are unaected by immigration. In order to better uncover
this relationship, in columns (5)-(7), we disaggregate property crimes further. It turns out
that immigration increases the incidence of robberies and thefts. Since the latter represent
about 60% of total crimes in our sample, the relationship between immigration and property
crimes may be the main channel through which immigrants increase the overall crime rate.
However, there could be several reasons why the size of the immigrant population is sys-
tematically correlated with property crimes, some of which may not be adequately captured
by control variables. Therefore, identifying causality requires a source of exogenous variation
in the immigrant population, an issue that we tackle in the next section.
7The distribution of residence permits across provinces is decided on a yearly basis by the government in










































Even after controlling for other determinants of crime and for xed eects, the distribution of
the immigrant population across provinces could be correlated with the error term for several
reasons. First, our set of controls could neglect some time-varying, possibly unobserved
demand-pull factors that are also correlated with crime. For instance, improvements in labor
market conditions that are not adequately captured by changes in ocial unemployment
and income could increase immigration and decrease crime, which would bias OLS estimates
downward. On the other hand, economic decline could attract immigrants to some areas (e.g.
because of lower housing prices) where crime is on the rise, which would bias OLS estimates
upward. Finally, changes in crime rates across provinces could themselves have a direct eect
on immigrants' location.
4.1 Methodology
In order to take these concerns into account, we adopt an instrumental variable approach that
uses the (exogenous) supply-push component of migration by nationality as an instrument
for shifts in the immigrant population across Italian provinces. Supply-push factors are all
events in origin countries that increase the propensity to emigrate; examples include economic
crises, political turmoil, wars and natural disasters (Card, 1990; Friedberg, 2001; Angrist and
Kugler, 2003; Munshi, 2003; Saiz, 2007). Since these are both important in determining
migration out
ows and independent of regional dierences within the host country, they
have often been used as a source of exogenous variation in the distribution of the immigrant
population.
Following the approach pioneered by Card (2001), several papers have constructed outcome-
based measures of supply-push factors using total migration 
ows by nationality toward the
destination country of interest (in our case, Italy); variation of the instrument results from
dierences in the beginning-of-period composition by nationality of the immigrant popula-
tion across dierent areas within the destination country (see, for instance, Ottaviano and
Peri, 2006; Cortes, 2008; Card, 2009). The predictive power of the instrument exploits the
fact that new immigrants of a given nationality tend to settle into the same areas as previ-
ous immigrants from the same country (see e.g. Munshi, 2003; Jaeger, 2006; McKenzie and
Rapoport, 2007). For the same reason, however, total in
ows by nationality could still be
correlated with local demand-pull factors. As an extreme case, if all immigrants from a given
country moved to the same Italian province, it would be impossible to disentangle push and
pull factors based on total in
ows by nationality.
To obviate this problem, our measure of supply-push factors will be based on bilateral
migration 
ows toward destination countries other than Italy. As 
ows towards Italy represent
only a minor fraction of 









































2be uncorrelated with shocks in a given Italian province.8 Specically, we rst take within-






it   popit; (4)
where lnMIGRn
it is the log change of the stock of immigrants of nationality n in province
i between period t   1 and t; popit is the log change of province population; nally, !n
it 1
is the share of immigrants of nationality n over total immigrants residing in province i in






The rst term on the right hand side of equation (4) is the weighted sum of the log
changes of immigrants of each nationality into destination province i. These depend both
on supply-push factors in each origin country (which aect that nationality in all provinces)
and demand-pull factors in each province (which aect all nationalities in that province). In
order to exclude the latter, we substitute lnMIGRn
it with the log change of immigrants
of nationality n in other destination countries, lnMIGRn
t . Hence, we dene the predicted







Since demand-pull factors in other destination countries can be reasonably thought of as
exogenous to variation in crime across Italian provinces, the correlation between migrit
and \ migrit must be due solely to supply-push factors in origin countries.
4.2 Data
The weights in equation (5) are constructed according to the distribution of residence permits
by nationality and province in year 1990. As an exogenous measure of supply-push factors
by origin country one would ideally use total out
ows toward the rest of the World excluding
Italy. Unfortunately, such data are not generally available. As for European destinations,
however, Eurostat provides extracts of 1991 and 2001 country censuses reporting, among other
things, the number of foreign residents by country of birth. Though coverage is limited to the
most relevant origin-destination cells, we were able to reconstruct the decennial (log) changes
in 11 European countries for 13 foreign communities which are also heavily represented in
Italy, accounting for 48% and 56% of Italian residence permits in 1991 and 2001, respectively.
The detailed list of origin and destination countries used to construct the instrument is
presented in Appendix B.
8Consider for example the in
ows from former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia (the nationalities which
grew the most in this period) towards respectively Rome and Vicenza (the Italian provinces which received
most in
ows from these nationalities). Rome accounted for only 2% of the total in
ows from former Soviet
Union towards EU countries and Vicenza accounted for only 1% of the total in










































2Of course, our instrument predicts actual immigration to Italy only to the extent that
supply-push factors are important enough to drive similar patterns of immigration by na-
tionality in Italy and in the rest of Europe. Figure 5 shows that this is actually the case.
Weighting such push factors by the distribution of each nationality across provinces in 1990
(according to the formula in 5), we obtain indeed a statistically signicant predictor for the
actual changes in immigrant population across Italian provinces over the following decade.





\ migrit; R2 = 0:13;
where the numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimated coecients.
4.3 Results
Once equipped with a source of exogenous variation for immigrant population we proceed
to examine the causal content of the positive relationship between immigration and crime
rates (through property crimes) depicted by the OLS estimates. Since the instrument in
(5) is available as a cross section of ten-year changes between 1991 and 2001, we run all
regressions on the within-province dierences of equation (3) over the same period, including
as regressors all control variables that were also included in the panel estimates presented in
the previous section.
4.3.1 OLS and IV estimates
The results are reported in Tables 4-6. For the sake of comparability between OLS and
IV, the rst column of each table reports OLS estimates on the rst-dierenced equation,
which are broadly consistent with the panel estimates using all years. Overall, immigration is
associated with higher crime rates through a positive and statistically signicant correlation
with the incidence of property crimes. The magnitude of such eects is also very similar to
the estimates reported in Table 3.
We notice however that the magnitude of these estimates drop signicantly once our
control variables are included. For example, the OLS estimated coecient of migrit on
total crime is 0.19 if no control variables are included while it drops to 0.16 once we control
for changes in provincial GDP (and to 0.156 once all controls are added, see Table 4 column 1).
A similar drop is observed in the estimated eects on property crimes.9 This may be driven
by the fact that positive changes in GDP are associated both with increased immigration and
increased crime, especially property crime, which may in turn suggest that, due to omitted
variables, the true (causal) eect of immigration on crime is considerably smaller than what
implied by our OLS estimates.









































2In the next columns we then examine whether the above mentioned correlation re
ects a
causal eect of immigration on crime. In column (2) of Table 4 we start with a reduced form
regression of (log-changes of) crime on the supply-push component of immigration growth.
The estimated coecient is not signicantly dierent from zero. This may be due either
to lack of a causal eect or to the fact that the correlation between actual and predicted
changes in immigration is too low. In column 3 we adopt a two-stage-least-squares approach
to distinguish between these two alternative explanations. According to the results, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coecient of immigration in the second stage is
not signicantly dierent from zero.
However, such nding is not conclusive about causality, being driven both by the point
estimate falling below the OLS coecient and by a substantial increase in the estimated
standard errors. Since the latter may signal low instrument relevance, we next investigate
further the explanatory power of the instrument and the sensitivity of the results to changes
in the rst stage correlation between actual and predicted immigration.
4.3.2 Instrument relevance
If the rst stage is weak, IV estimates may suer from nite-sample bias and low asymptotic
eciency. Starting with the rst issue, most tests relate the size of the distortion to the
F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the coecient of the excluded instrument is equal to
zero in the rst stage. In our case such statistic is equal to 13.14 (see the bottom panel of
Table 4), which is above the value of 10 indicated by the literature on weak instruments (see,
in particular Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock et al., 2002).10
Turning to asymptotic eciency, it is well known that the precision of IV estimates
increases with the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable. One
measure of such correlation is the partial R2 for the excluded instrument in the rst stage,
which is also reported on the bottom of Table 4. Nelson and Startz (1990) suggest that an
instrument is likely to be weak if the (bias-corrected) partial R2 falls short of the inverse of
the number of observations. According to this requirement, we can strongly reject that this
is an issue in our case.11
Still, it may be informative to examine the sensitivity of the results to a better t in the
rst-stage. One simple way to achieve that consists in allowing for a non-linear relationship
between migr and \ migr. The smoothing regression in Figure 6 suggests in fact that a
quadratic polynomial may provide a better approximation of the relationship between the
two variables (as opposed to a simple linear regression).
10While such threshold is basically a rule-of-thumb provided for practical purposes, it is broadly consistent
with detailed critical values tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005). Such values are however not available for
the just identied case.
11The bias-corrected R
2 is dened as ((N  1)R
2  2)=(N  2); where N is the number of observations. The
bias-corrected R









































2We thus compute the linear-quadratic prediction \ migr
qfit










it; R2 = 0:24;
and use it as an instrument for migr.12 The coecient of the quadratic term is indeed
negative and strongly statistically signicant. One likely explanation is the existence of \con-
gestion eects" of the kind discussed in Borjas (1994). Most importantly for our purposes,
the R2 of the regression increases from 0.13 to 0.24. After including all control variables on
the right-hand side, the partial R2 of the rst-stage regression does also increase from 0.09
to 0.15 and, as a consequence, the standard errors in the second stage decrease by about one
third (column 4 of Table 4). Interestingly, as the precision of the estimates improves, the es-
timated coecient of \ migrit decreases further, from 0.10 to 0.03. This last nding suggests
that the dierence between IV and OLS estimates is not driven by the higher asymptotic
variance of the former: the estimated coecient in the second stage approaches zero when
instrument relevance is highest (as re
ected in the rst stage F-statistics for the excluded
instrument equal to 33), pointing at lack of a causal eect of immigration on crime.
4.3.3 Heterogeneous eects
Another possible explanation for the dierence between OLS and IV estimates is that the
latter are based on a subset of nationalities (i.e. those for which we found Census data in
Eurostat). If the excluded nationalities had a higher propensity to commit crime than those
included in the instrument, that could cause indeed the observed drop in magnitude and
signicance from OLS to IV.
We address this concern in two dierent ways. First, we run again the OLS regression after
constructing a new measure of immigration, ] migr, which includes only those nationalities
that are also included in the instrument. The results, reported in column (5), are very
similar to those obtained considering all nationalities (column 1), suggesting that restricting
to a subset of nationalities does not drive the dierence between IV and OLS estimates.
The second robustness check consists in expanding the subset of nationalities included in
the instrument. To overcome the limitations of our main source of data, we merge information
from two alternative sources. Specically, we rst obtained the stock of immigrants by origin
country from the Global Migrant Origin Database, maintained by the Migration Development
Research Center at the University of Sussex. This data set reports the number of people by
country of origin and destination, based on country censuses, for a wider set of countries
than Eurostat; at the same time, it is available only for year 2001. We then reconstructed
12Alternatively, we can insert both \ migr and \ migr
2
directly into the rst stage. When we do that, we
obtain identical point estimates and standard errors, as well as an over-identifying restriction (not signicantly
dierent from zero according to the Sargan statistic). However, the number of over-identifying restrictions
and degrees of freedom delivered by this alternative procedure are conceptually 
awed because the source of









































2the beginning-of-period stocks in year 1991 by subtracting from the 2001 values the bilateral
migration 
ows between 1991 and 2001, recently made available by Ortega and Peri (2009).
In this way, we could compute the (log) change in the stock of migrants from 63 countries
(or regions) toward 14 OECD countries. This is of course a crude approximation of the
true change in the size of such communities, because we are neglecting out
ows due to
return migration.13 Measurement error might indeed be the reason why this instrument,
\ migrOECD, performs worse in the rst stage; see the last two columns in Table 4. Yet, weak
instrument diagnostics remain the safe region, at least when using the quadratic specication
(column 7). Most importantly, the point estimate in the second stage is always very close to
zero, suggesting that neither heterogeneous eects across nationalities nor higher standard
errors explain the dierence between OLS and IV results. Rather, the results in Table 4
suggest that the positive and signicant OLS estimated coecient does not re
ect a causal
eect of immigration on crime.
This conclusion is reinforced when we focus on the subset of property crimes, which
parallel very closely those for the aggregate crime rate (Table 5). In particular, the positive
and signicant eect estimated by OLS is not conrmed by the instrumental variable analysis.
When we further distinguish between dierent types of property crimes, the causal eect of
immigration is positive and statistically signicant only for robberies (Table 6), which vary
approximately one-to-one (in percentage terms) with immigration.14 Yet, within our sample
robberies represent only 1.8% and 1.5% of property and total crimes, respectively, which
explains why the incidence of neither property nor total crimes is signicantly related to
immigration. Finally, the IV results for violent and drug-related crimes conrm the OLS
estimates in excluding the existence of a signicant relationship with immigration.15
5 Robustness
Our ndings are subject to several caveats. First, one may be concerned with the measure-
ment of immigrant population. Second, if both immigrants and natives have high mobility
within the country, one may question the validity of estimates based on variation across
provinces. We now examine each dimension in turn.
5.1 Measurement
A rst issue concerns the size of unocial migration to Italy. As discussed in Section 2, we
used demands for regularization to infer the distribution of irregular immigrants, arguing
that this approach minimizes under-reporting. In principle, however, one can not exclude
13These may be up to to 10% of the total stock of immigrants; see the discussion in Ortega and Peri (2009).
14According to this estimate, a standard deviation increase in the log-change of immigrant population across
provinces between 1991 and 2001 (equal to 53%) would lead to 202 additional robberies (out of 413 in 1991).









































2that immigrants self-select into regularization, which would introduce measurement error
into equation (2). In particular, if immigrants who are more at risk of committing crime are
also less likely to apply for a regular permit, we would be understating immigrants exactly
where they contribute the most to crime, which in turn would bias the coecient of migr
downward.
To address this concern, notice rst that if both ocial and unocial immigrants of the
same nationality cluster into the same areas, then the IV approach adopted in Section 4 would
attenuate any bias due to under reporting of unocial immigrants. In fact, our instrument
provides a measure for the predicted log change of total immigrants that depends solely on
the geographic distribution of these clusters and the supply-push factors in origin countries.
As a more direct check, we have considered a number of alternative ways to estimate
irregular immigration. First, we looked at apprehensions of irregular immigrants (as recorded
by Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2007), which do not depend on self-selection. Indeed, after
controlling for province and year xed eects (which are always included in our specications)
the log of apprehensions is positively and signicantly related to the log of applications for
regularization. In particular, the OLS estimated coecient of the univariate regression is
0.35, the t-ratio is 3.87 and the R2 is 85%. Therefore, apprehension- and regularization-
based measures of unocial immigration seem consistent with each other. At the same time,
regularizations provide a more representative picture of the phenomenon.16
As a further robustness check, we have estimated the immigrant population under al-
ternative assumptions about the distribution of irregular immigrants out of regularization
years.17 For example, one may think that irregular immigrants arrive in each province at the
same rate in all years between two regularizations or, alternatively, they arrive at higher rates
the closer it gets to the regularization year. Therefore, we have adopted either a uniform
or an exponential specication for the growth rate of irregular immigrants: in the former
case, it is constant in a given province between two regularization years, while in the latter
it doubles in each period.18 The result of these estimates are presented in Table 7. Columns
(1)-(3) consider the case of uniform growth; column (4)-(6) the case of exponential growth.
For each method, we have reported both OLS and IV results. All these results appear very
similar, both in magnitude and signicance, to our previous estimates.
Another issue related to the measurement of immigration concerns its composition. So
far we included all residence permits, regardless of the nationality, in order to avoid arbitrary
16In 1995 there were less than 64,000 apprehensions and 260,000 demands for regularization; this ratio was
61,000 over 250,000 in 1998 and 106,000 over 700,000 in 2002
17Fasani (2009) implements a similar approach.
18Formally, suppose that in a given regularization year s the number of unocial immigrants, estimated
by the number of application for regularization, is IRRi;s and the previous regularization occurred in year
r. We estimate the total number of immigrants MIGRit in province i for each year t 2 (r + 1;s) as the
sum of ocial immigrants and a fraction wt  IRRi;s of the unocial ones. The weights wt are chosen such
that IRRi;t   IRRi;t 1 = IRRi;t 1   IRRi;t 2 for the uniform case and such that IRRi;t   IRRi;t 1 =
2(IRRi;t 1   IRRi;t 2) for the exponential case. Consistently with our previous analysis, our measure of









































2classications. On the other hand, most crime concerns are directed toward immigrants from
developing countries. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the relationship
between nationality and propensity to commit crime, one may wonder whether adopting this
broader denition introduces error in the measurement of those immigrants that could be
more at risk of committing crime.19 Therefore, we checked the robustness of our estimates
to using only residence permits awarded to immigrants from developing countries (as dened
by ISTAT). The results are presented in Table 8 (columns 1-3), and are remarkably similar
to those obtained using all residence permits.
5.2 Methodology
Our empirical strategy is mostly based on the relation between immigration and crime across
dierent areas within the same country, an approach that has a long tradition in the empirical
literature on the eects of immigration in the labor market (see e.g. Card, 2001). Yet,
such approach is sometimes criticized on the grounds that general equilibrium adjustments
in native population would confound the comparison between areas with dierent levels of
immigration; put dierently, immigration would aect all areas at the same time, not just
the one that actually receives immigrants (Borjas et al., 1996; Borjas, 2003). If this is the
case, any eect on the crime rate would be measured by correlation over time at the country
level rather than across provinces. As already pointed out, however, Figure 3 suggests that
the relationship between immigration and crime is not signicant at the national level (other
than across provinces).
Another reason why cross areas comparisons may be uninformative is the mobility of
criminals, which gives rise to spatial correlation in local crime data. In line with the literature
on spatial econometrics and crime (Anselin, 1988; Gibbons, 2004; Zenou, 2003), we thus
control for spatially lagged crime rates. These consist of weighted averages of crime rates in
neighboring provinces. In particular, crime in each province is assumed to depend also on
crime observed in any other province, weighted by the inverse of the distance between their
respective capital cities. The results, presented in Table 8 (columns 4-6), are consistent with
those in our baseline specication. Hence, spatial correlation does not aect our results. This
is probably due to the fact that provinces are rather large geographical areas, so that crime
trips occur within rather than across provinces.
19This measurement issue is particularly relevant for Italy. In our sample, about 85% of all immigrants from
outside developing countries came from the U.S. and Switzerland. These are very specic groups: the rst











































In this paper, we investigated the causal impact of immigration on crime across Italian
provinces during the 1990s. Our results do not support the widespread perception of a causal
relationship between immigration and crime. Indeed, we nd that neither the overall crime
rate nor the number of most types of criminal oense are signicantly related to the size of
the immigrant population (once endogeneity is taken into account). These results leave many
avenues for future research open, and we sketch only a few here.
First, our results raise the question of what determines the widespread perception of
a link between immigration and crime. This issue is of the utmost importance given that
such perceptions have far-reaching consequences for immigration policies (Bauer et al., 2000).
Second, our analysis can be extended in search of more detailed mechanisms. For example, it
would be interesting to explore natives' response to an increase in immigration. In particular,
our results could be due to the fact that there is substitution between immigrants' and natives'
crime. Finally, it would be interesting to estimate separately the eect of ocial and unocial
immigrants. A better understanding of such mechanisms appears crucial for detailed policy
prescriptions.
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Appendix A
Variables: denitions and sources
migr: log of residence permits over the total province population, as of December 31 of each
year. Source: Ministry of the Interior.
total: log of reported crimes in each province and year. This category includes murder, serious
assault, rape, sex oence, theft, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, incrimination for criminal
association, arson, terrorism, drug-related crime, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, prostitu-
tion and other crimes. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of
Statistics.
violent: log of reported violent crimes over the total population in each province and year.
Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
property: log of reported property crimes over the total population in each province and
year. This category includes robberies, thefts and car thefts. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie
Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
theft: log of reported thefts over the total population in each province and year. This
category includes several types of crime such as: bag snatch and pickpocketing. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
robbery: log of reported robberies over the total population in each province and year. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
car theft: log of reported car thefts over the total population in each province and year.
Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
drug: log of reported drug-related crimes over the total population in each province and year.
This category includes tracking, consumption and pushing. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie
Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
pop: log of the resident population in each province and year. Source: Popolazione e movi-
mento anagraco dei comuni - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
urban: percentage of the population living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in









































2National Institute of Statistics.
male1539: percentage of young males aged 15-39 in the population in each province and
year. Source: Popolazione e movimento anagraco dei comuni - Italian National Institute of
Statistics.
gdp: log of real GDP per capita in each province and year. Source: Conti Economici Terri-
toriali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
unemp: percentage unemployment ratio in each province and year. Source: Labour Force
Survey - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
clear-up: percentage ratio of the number of crimes solved by the police to the total number of
reported crimes, for each province, year and crime category. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie
Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
partisan: ideology of the provincial government. This variable is constructed as follows.
First, a score between 0 (extreme left) and 20 (extreme right) is attached to each politi-
cal party according to the expert surveys presented in Benoit and Laver (2006) (these data
are available at http://www.tcd.ie/Political Science/ppmd/). Then, the score of the local
government is computed as the average score of all parties entering the executive cabinet
weighted by the number of seats held by each party in the local council (the composition of
Italian local councils is available at http://amministratori.interno.it/).
Appendix B
Countries included in the construction of the instrument
Eurostat data
origin countries: Albania, Algeria, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Morocco, Nigeria, Pak-
istan, Philippines, Romania, Tunisia and Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia,
Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro, Slovenia)
destination countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland
Global Migration Origin Database and Ortega and Peri (2009)
origin countries: Albania, Algeria, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway,









































2(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan), Spain, Sri
Lanka, Suriname, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Vietnam
and Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia & Montenegro,
Slovenia)
destination countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan,
































































































0 20 40 60 80 100
% concerned about jobs
Note: This graph presents the results of the \National Identity" survey
conducted in 1995 and 2003 by the International Social Survey Pro-
gramme. It plots, for each country, the percentage of people who de-
clared to \Strongly Agree" or \Agree" that \Immigrants increase crime
rates" (on the vertical axis) against percentage of people who declared
to \Strongly Agree" or \Agree" that \Immigrants take jobs away from






































































































-1 -.5 0 .5 1
log of official immigrants over population (residuals)
Note: This gure plots the residuals obtained after regressing the log
of total immigrants (on the vertical axis) and the log of ocial im-
migrants (on the horizontal axis) on province- and year-xed eects,
together with the 45-degree line. The (estimated) number of total im-
migrants is given by the sum of residence permits and applications
for regularization. The source of data on both residence permits and





















































































property crimes drug-related crimes
violent crimes other crimes
residence permits
Note: This graph shows the evolution over time of reported crimes and residence permits
in Italy. The histogram refers to the number of reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants,
distinguishing between dierent categories of criminal oenses. The line refers to the number
of residence permits awarded to immigrants in Italy, per 100,000 inhabitants. The source of










































2Figure 4: Immigration and crime across provinces
Note: These gures show the distribution, across Italian provinces, of the number of immi-
grants and reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. All variables are yearly averages during
the period 1990-2003. Provinces are colored according to which quartile of the distribution
they belong to; darker colors refer to higher values. The extremes of each quartile, along
with the corresponding color, are reported at the bottom of each map. The sources of data




































































































−.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
log−change of immigrants in the rest of Europe
Note: This gure plots the log change of the immigrant population in Italy
during the 1991-2001 period (on the vertical axis) against the log change of
immigrant population in other European countries during the same period
(on the horizontal axis), by country of origin. Immigrant population in Italy
is measured by the number of residence permits, as reported by the Italian
Ministry of the Interior. Immigrant population in other European countries
is measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The desti-
nation countries for which we obtained census data are: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
Switzerland. Information on the stock of immigrants in those countries was
available for the following nationalities: Albania, Algeria, Brazil, China (ex-
cluding Hong Kong), Egypt, India, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines,











































































-.5 0 .5 1 1.5
predicted log-change of permits
Note: This gure plots the actual log-changes of immigrants in Italian
provinces between 1991 and 2001 (on the vertical axis) against the predicted
log-changes during the same period (on the horizontal axis), together with the
kernel-weighted local polynomial regression between the two variables. The
actual number of immigrants is measured by the number of residence permits,
as reported by the Italian Ministry of Interior. The predicted log-change is
the weighted sum of the log-changes of immigrant population by nationality
in other European countries. The weights are the shares of permits held by
each nationality over total permits in that province in 1990 (see equation 5
in the main text). Immigrant population in other European countries is mea-
sured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The destination
countries for which we obtained census data are Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzer-
land. Information on the stock of immigrants in those countries was avail-
able for the following nationalities: Albania, Algeria, Brazil, China (excluding










































2Table 1: Descriptive statistics
obs. mean std. dev. min max
Residence permits per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 1353 1187 44 7873
Total crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 3388 1350 1072 13404
Violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 50 29 1 230
Property crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 2615 1216 442 7879
robberies 1330 37 41 2 385
thefts 1330 1943 909 321 6049
car thefts 1330 287 281 29 1648
Drug-related crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 64 45 5 918
migr 1330 6.87 0.85 3.78 8.97
total 1330 8.06 0.37 6.98 9.50
violent 1330 3.76 0.55 0.33 5.44
property 1330 7.77 0.45 6.09 8.97
robbery 1330 3.29 0.75 0.78 5.95
theft 1330 7.47 0.45 5.77 8.71
car theft 1330 5.30 0.83 3.37 7.41
drug 1330 4.00 0.57 1.67 6.82
pop 1330 13.01 0.70 11.41 15.18
urban 1235 14.62 20.15 0.00 88.11
male1539 1330 18.01 1.23 14.41 21.03
gdp 1235 9.55 0.26 8.94 10.11
unemp 1045 10.43 7.09 1.68 33.16
clear-up (total crimes) 1330 30.54 10.47 9.20 82.75
clear-up (violent crimes) 1330 82.03 12.93 23.32 100.00
clear-up (property crimes) 1330 6.92 3.18 1.60 30.83
clear-up (drug-related crimes) 1330 95.77 5.61 37.71 100.00
partisan 1330 10.26 1.75 5.90 16.30
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables across the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Table 3: Panel regressions: baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
total violent property drug robbery theft car theft
migr 0.102 0.003 0.084 -.103 0.092 0.093 0.057
(0.039) (0.084) (0.028) (0.074) (0.05) (0.03) (0.041)
pop 0.028 -.338 0.96 -2.550 4.285 1.155 0.365
(0.641) (1.660) (0.718) (1.552) (1.026) (0.686) (0.958)
urban 0.003 -.003 0.003 -.010 0.0007 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
male1539 0.131 0.236 0.041 0.325 -.145 0.052 0.1
(0.045) (0.11) (0.053) (0.108) (0.084) (0.053) (0.072)
gdp 0.15 -.116 0.171 0.423 -.155 0.113 0.611
(0.14) (0.319) (0.166) (0.378) (0.267) (0.164) (0.232)
unemp -.004 0.011 -.007 0.019 -.022 -.006 -.003
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.01) (0.003) (0.01)
clear-up -.004 -.008 -.030 0.0003 -.005 -.030 -.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003)
partisan 0.007 0.045 0.007 0.023 0.006 0.007 -.003
(0.01) (0.019) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011)
Obs. 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045 1,045
Provinces 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
Prov. FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.220 0.321 0.302 0.189 0.241 0.28 0.323
F-stat. 14.81 7.37 11.68 17.26 14.17 9.77 14.72
Note: This table presents the results of OLS estimates on a panel of yearly observations for all 95 Italian provinces
during the period 1991-2003. The dependent variable is the log of crimes reported by the police over the total
population, for each category of criminal oense. The variable migr is the log of immigrants (i.e. residence
permits) over province population. The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are ISTAT and
the Italian Ministry of the Interior, respectively. All other variables are dened in the Appendix. Province and
year xed-eects are included in all specications. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **










































2Table 4: Ten-year dierence regressions: total crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
migr .156 .105 .029 .055 -.029





Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
F statistic 5.401 3.095 3.395 3.243 6.399 3.283 3.001














F-stat. (excl. instr.) 13.14 33.01 5.11 12.93
Partial R2 (excl. instr.) .094 .155 .049 .118
Note: This table presents the results of OLS and IV estimates on the cross section of ten-year dierences
between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log change of total
crimes reported by the police over the total population. Second-stage estimated coecients are reported in
the top panel. The variable migr is the log change of immigrants (i.e. residence permits) over province
population; \ migr is an instrument constructed as the sum of the log changes of immigrant population for
some nationalities in other European countries weighted by the beginning-of-period share of each nationality
in Italian provinces (see equation 5); nally,  ] migr is the log-change of the subset of nationalities included
in the instrument. The bottom panel reports rst-stage regressions of migr on \ migr and on several
alternative instruments described in section 4.3. The ten-year changes of all control variables in Tables 3 and
?? are always included, both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits and
reported crimes are the Italian Ministry of the Interior and ISTAT, respectively. Immigrant population in
other European countries is measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for
excluded instruments refers to the null hypothesis that the coecients of such instruments is equal to zero
in the rst stage. The partial R
2 is the correlation between migr and the excluded instruments. Robust
standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the









































2Table 5: Ten-year dierence regressions: property crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
migr .136 .046 .026 -.085 -.027





Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95 95
F statistic 6.947 4.847 5.248 5.134 7.548 4.333 4.731














F-stat. (excl. instr.) 11.11 36.46 3.85 12.78
Partial R2 (excl. instr.) .091 .169 .042 .130
Note: This table presents the results of OLS and IV estimates on the cross section of ten-year dierences
between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log change of property
crimes reported by the police over the total population. Second-stage estimated coecients are reported in
the top panel. The variable migr is the log change of immigrants (i.e. residence permits) over province
population; \ migr is an instrument constructed as the sum of the log changes of immigrant population for
some nationalities in other European countries weighted by the beginning-of-period share of each nationality
in Italian provinces (see equation 5); nally,  ] migr is the log-change of the subset of nationalities included
in the instrument. The bottom panel reports rst-stage regressions of migr on \ migr and on several
alternative instruments described in section 4.3. The ten-year changes of all control variables in Tables 3 and
?? are always included, both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits and
reported crimes are the Italian Ministry of the Interior and ISTAT, respectively. Immigrant population in
other European countries is measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for
excluded instruments refers to the null hypothesis that the coecients of such instruments is equal to zero in
the rst stage. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Table 7: Robustness: Irregular immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
uniform exponential
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
migr 0.173 0.111 0.021 0.163 0.111 0.021
(0.050) (0.196) (0.119) (0.050) (0.196) (0.120)
Obs. 95 95 95 95 95 95
F- stat. 5.70 5.55
R2 0.254 0.247
First-stage






F- stat. (excl. instr.) 9.30 28.83 9.41 29.00
Partial R2 (excl. instr.) 0.087 0.165 0.084 0.159
Note: This table presents the results of OLS and IV estimates on the cross section of ten-year dierences
between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log change of total
crimes reported by the police over the total population. Second-stage estimated coecients are reported in
the top panel. In column (1)-(3), the variable migr is the log-change of immigrants over province population,
where migr is derived by estimating the unocial immigrants between two regularization years according to
a uniform law (see footnote 18 in the main text). In column (4)-(6), the variable migr is the log-change of
immigrants over province population, where migr is derived by estimating the unocial immigrants between
two regularization years according to an exponential law (see footnote 18 in the main text). \ migr is an
instrument constructed as the sum of the log changes of immigrant population for some nationalities in other
European countries weighted by the beginning-of-period share of each nationality in Italian provinces (see
equation 5). The bottom panel reports rst-stage regressions of migr on \ migr and on \ migr
qfit
, as
described in section 4.3. The ten-year changes of all control variables in Tables 3 and ?? are always included,
both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are the
Italian Ministry of the Interior and ISTAT, respectively. Immigrant population in other European countries is
measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for excluded instruments refers
to the null hypothesis that the coecients of such instruments is equal to zero in the rst stage. The partial
R
2 is the correlation between migr and the excluded instruments. Robust standard errors are presented in
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%,









































2Table 8: Robustness: Immigrants from developing countries and spatial correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
developing countries spatial correlation
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
migr 0.148 0.101 0.028 0.153 0.098 0.022
(0.051) (0.180) (0.117) (0.047) (0.190) (0.125)
Spatial lag 0.301 0.380 0.387
(0.520) (0.479) (0.477)










F-stat. (excl. instr.) 12.59 30.85 13.14 33.01
Partial R2 (excl. instr.) 0.101 0.174
Note: This table presents the results of OLS and IV estimates on the cross section of ten-year dierences
between 1991 and 2001 across all 95 Italian provinces. The dependent variable is the log change of total
crimes reported by the police over the total population. Second-stage estimated coecients are reported in
the top panel. In column (1)-(3), the variable migr is the log change of immigrants from developing countries
over the province population. In columns (4)-(6), the variable migr is the log-change of immigrants over
province population and the spatial lag is the weighted sum of the log of crimes over the population in all other
provinces, with weighting matrix based on the inverse of road traveling distance between provinces. \ migr
is an instrument constructed as the sum of the log changes of immigrant population for some nationalities in
other European countries weighted by the beginning-of-period share of each nationality in Italian provinces
(see equation 5). The bottom panel reports rst-stage regressions of migr on \ migr and on \ migr
qfit
, as
described in section 4.3. The ten-year changes of all control variables in Tables 3 and ?? are always included,
both in the rst and second stage. The sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are the
Italian Ministry of the Interior and ISTAT, respectively. Immigrant population in other European countries is
measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The F-statistic for excluded instruments refers
to the null hypothesis that the coecients of such instruments is equal to zero in the rst stage. The partial
R
2 is the correlation between migr and the excluded instruments. Robust standard errors are presented in
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of the coecient being equal to 0 at 10%,
5% and 1% signicance level, respectively.
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